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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. 
By Walter F. Murphy,1 James E. Fleming,2 and William F. 
Harris, 11.3 Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 1986. 
Pp. xxvi, 1262. 
Fred L. Morrison4 
Law is one of the major unifying themes of our contemporary 
culture. A leading university which recently inventoried its "cross-
disciplinary" courses discovered that the most frequent offerings 
were in law. It was "business law" in the business school, "law and 
medicine" in several divisions of the health sciences, "law for engi-
neers" in the engineering school, etc. 
One of the most venerable of these cross-disciplinary subjects is 
constitutional law. There are really three distinct courses in most 
universities which masquerade under that common name. In law 
schools, Constitutional Law is designed to teach the mechanics of 
the allocation and limitation of power (and of challenges to it), pri-
marily to students who, as lawyers, will help to operate the system. 
Even in law schools, the course may further the broad goals of a 
liberal education; but it is also true that only in law schools do the 
students focus on the technical details of pleading and practice. Ac-
cordingly, law teachers generally skip over historical topics, empha-
sizing the present and future tenses. 
In history departments, study of the Constitution naturally has 
a different purpose, emphasizing the past tense. The Constitution 
makes superb history: perhaps nowhere else is there as continuous 
and articulate a representation of the ideas and issues which have 
driven our society, from nation-building in the early years, through 
the dispute over slavery and states' rights in the nineteenth century, 
the emergence of economic liberalism and commercial growth, the 
acceptance of the government as a provider of social services, the 
demand for (and definition of) equality, and the protection of the 
poor and oppressed. The reports of the Court are of particular use 
in this context because of the separate opinions, which frequently 
join issue on the key philosophical questions of the day. (The ab-
sence of separate opinions may be even more revelatory of the intel-
lectual climate.) 
Political scientists have stood at the crossroads of the legal and 
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historical traditions-and of others, such as sociology-and have 
tried to make a niche for themselves in the study of the Constitu-
tion. Some have tried to tum the Constitutional Law course into a 
haven for pre-law students, seeking to replicate the customs of legal 
education, including both breadth of coverage (touching the entire 
range of constitutional issues) and format of instruction (a Langdel-
lian case-method). Others have tried to emulate the historical ap-
proach, chronicling the history of a particular era of the Court or 
attempting a comprehensive analysis. Still others have sought ref-
uge in the hard sciences of mathematics and statistics, using multi-
ple regressions to obtain correlations which may or may not be 
explicable to the average reader. 
American Constitutional Interpretation exemplifies neither the 
purely legal nor the purely historical approach. It is a text and case 
book for undergraduate political science students which emphasizes 
the role of the Supreme Court as an institution in the governmental 
structure of the United States, especially through its authoritative 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
Although it contains cases, it is not a law text. It does not 
purport to provide materials for a comprehensive course on Consti-
tutional Law in the law school sense. It is also not a history text. It 
does not provide a complete and chronological history of constitu-
tional interpretation, but rather selects from basic historical periods 
for its principal purpose, an examination of the role of constitu-
tional interpretation in American government. 
In addition to the usual selection of case materials, there is, for 
each major section, an introductory essay by the authors, mention-
ing the salient questions, and a selection of articles by other authors, 
presenting a balanced perspective on the issues. In the section on 
Problems of Continuity and Change, for example, there are paired 
pieces by Justice Rehnquist (as he then was) and Professor Dwor-
kin. Other extra-judicial material, from the Federalist papers to 
Presidential messages, adds to this useful mix. 
Three basic issues emerge: What is the Constitution? Who 
should interpret it? How should it be interpreted? The first explores 
the questions of incorporation of the Bill of Rights, penumbras of 
rights, and evolutionary vs. fixed interpretation. The second exam-
ines both separation of powers issues and federalism. The third, 
and most extensive, deals with the interpretation of broad principles 
in the Constitution, the protection of civil liberties (especially first 
amendment issues) and equal protection. The book enables stu-
dents to learn how the Supreme Court can evolve a complex and 
detailed set of constitutional mandates from a few simple words, 
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"Congress shall make no law ... "or "nor shall any state ... deny 
to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." In focusing on 
the question of interpretation, the authors emphasize the ability of 
our constitutional system to deduce from broad general principles a 
resolution of issues appropriate to the time and circumstances. 
A final segment deals with constitutional law in times of mili-
tary or foreign crisis, illustrating both the power and the limits of 
constitutional interpretation. This section emphasizes the constitu-
tional issues of the Civil War and of World War II. One might have 
wished for a discussion of other, more contemporary crises, in 
which constitutional interpretation helped to resolve serious polit-
ical problems-for example, Watergate. 
The Constitution will soon be guiding us into a third century of 
national government. The method of interpretation which has en-
sured such durability, when constitutions around the world have 
changed and changed again during that period, is certainly worthy 
of study. This book centers on that process of interpretation, rather 
than on particular interpretations present or past, and thus should 
contribute measurably to the student's knowledge of our govern-
mental system. It is neither a manual for lawyers nor a reference 
work for historians, but rather an excellent text for students of the 
art of government. 
JUDICIAL CONFLICf AND CONSENSUS-BEHAV-
IORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE 
COURTS. Edited by Sheldon Goldmant and Charles M. 
Lamb.2 Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky. 
1986. Pp. 294. $30.00. 
Thomas P. Lewis 3 
The political scientists who wrote the twelve essays in this 
book are justifiably described in the overleaf as "major scholars of 
judicial behavior." Their contributions, though published here for 
the first time, do not form a tightly cohesive whole; the thread that 
holds them together is their common focus on dissenting opinions 
in cases decided at the appellate level of the federal and state court 
systems. The editors explain that the book is aimed at a diverse 
audience of students and scholars in political science, social psy-
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